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In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence Bonjour criticizes
advocates of externalist versions of foundationalism. According to Bonjour,
"externalism reflects an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is
aimed."l With this in mind, Bonjour sets out to argue that externalism is not an
acceptable theory for the foundationalist to appeal to in his attempt to solve the
regress problem. In order to avoid a complete stalemate over doctrine, Bonjour's at
tempt to argue that externalism is unacceptable proceeds as an appeal to intuition.
As such he allows that" although this intuition may not constitute a conclusive ob
jection to the view, it is enough... to place the burden of proof squarely on the ex
ternalist."2 Bonjour's criticism is aimed at the externalist conception of justification.
I contend that Bonjour's demand of proof can be met by the externalist. Moreover,
as I shall argue, the proper conception of justification involves the use of both
internalist and externalist requirements. To establish my contention I shall draw the
internalist/ externalist distinction with regard to justification and examine the
intuitive strengths of each. Having completed these tasks we shall find that a proper
epistemology incorporates a level distinction between non-epistemological claims
on the first level and epistemological claims on the second level. Justification on the
first level, I shall argue, warrants externalist requirements, while justification on the
second level warrants internalist requirements.
In the field of epistemology one can be said to possess knowledge only if certain
requirements are met. Traditionally, these requirements have been the following,
S is said to know p iff,
1) P is the case
2) S believes that p
3) S's belief that p is adequately justified
It has been one of the main tasks of the epistemologist to elucidate the third require
ment. Just what is meant by "adequate justification?" Is it a requirement of the be
liever, or of the belief? The externalist/ internalist debate is centered around these
very questions. For the externalist, S's being able to justify the belief that p is
inessential to SiS having knowledge. On the other hand, Bonjour, an internalist, in
sists that S be able to justify his/her belief in order to have knowledge. 3 The follow

1BonJour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1985), p. 37.
2BonJour, p. 37.
3BonJour, p. 10.

ing example illustrates the distinction between the conceptualization of justification
on the part of the externalist and on the part of the internalist.
Suppose that you and your friend are enrolled in a Survey of Asian Art class.
Being the studious type you have paid attention in class, and kept up on assign
ments. Throughout the course you have diligently studied the material and have a
firm grasp of it. Your friend, on the other hand, has been altogether too occupied
with the good looks of a fellow classmate and hasn't heard a word of lecture.
Furthermore your friend hasn't even bought the books for the class, let alone
cracked one open. The night before the first exam, and having finished reviewing,
you check up on your friend's study. You find that your friend is extremely confused
about the time periods of two seemingly identical urns. You repeatedly tell your
friend, to no avail, which urn is from which century, failing to explain how it is you
can discern the one from the other. As if things couldn't get worse for the poor
chum, on the way to class the next day your friend trips and lands on a, unbeknown
to anyone, magical rock. The spill leaves your friend with a nasty bump on the head.
Now suppose just minutes before the exam is to be administered you finish taking a
last glance at your notes and your friend takes a look at the sheet with the two urns
on it. You ask your friend which urn is from which century and low and behold
your friend is correct. After the exam you decide to see if your friend was a lucky
guesser. You repeatedly question your friend and find that regardless of the order
you present pictures of the urns your friend is consistently correct. What has hap
pened, you see, is that the magical rock your friend landed on gave your friend a
subconscious awareness of one minute distinguishing factor between the urns
which now causes your friend to associate each urn with its correct century. When
you both receive your graded exams, you find that both you and your friend received
full credit on the urn question. Who has knowledge regarding this matter, you, your
friend, both you and your friend, neither you nor your friend?
By the externalist's lights both you and your friend know the fact regarding the
urn's origin. According to the internalist however, only you have that knowledge.
The externalist contends that because both you and your friend formed a true belief
in a reliable fashion, (you through study, your friend through a never failing sub
conscious mechanism) such that if the belief were not true neither one of you
would hold it, both instances constitute knowledge. Unlike the externalist, the in
ternalist looks to each of you for a reason justifying your holding your belief.
Moreover, what the internalist is ultimately concerned with is an individual's cog
nitive access to why it is that holding a belief is justified. In other words, the inter
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nalist, beyond asking for your reasons for holding the belief that p, asks for reasons
why these reasons are legitimate with regard to your right to think p is true. These
reasons for your reasons are spoken of as metajustifiers, since they justify your
justification for holding the belief that p. While you can account for your belief on
the basis of your study and offer a reason for why studying is a legitimate reason for
you to think your belief about the urns is true, your friend is at a complete loss to as
sociate the magical with his/her correct answer and most certainly wouldn't be able
to give a reason why the encounter with the magical rock ought to be considered a
legitimate belief forming mechanism. As a result, the internalist holds that you
have knowledge while your friend does not.
Having laid out the views of the externalist and internalist regarding epistemic
justification, we shall now examine Bonjour's contention that "externalism reflects
an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is aimed."4 Perhaps Bonjour
is motivated to make such a claim because of the historical perspective with which
he approaches the subject matter. Bonjour traces the notion of epistemic
justification to Descartes. Descartes, who adopted the approach of believing only that
which could not possibly be doubted, according to Bonjour, motivated the modern
epistemological tradition which "identifies epistemic justification with having a rea
son, perhaps even a conclusive reason, for thinking that the belief is true."s This
being the case, Bonjour contends that the externalist has made a break from the tra
dition, and "rather than offering a competing account of the same concept of epis
temic justification...has simply changed the subject."6 Has the externalist "simply
changed the subject?" Given that he is not concerned with SIS ability to give reasons
for her beliefs he most certainly has. The externalist does not consider the concept of
justification as applying to S the believer, but rather to SIS belief, a radical change
from tradition to be sure. Yet in changing the subject, has the externalist likewise
failed to give an adequate appreciation of his subject? The answer to this as we shall
see is "not entirely." Bonjour is simply mistaken in equating a change in approach
with inadequacy of that approach. By labeling it "inadequate" because of its differ
ences, Bonjour would have us dismiss the theory altogether. This would be a very
hasty decision, however, because, though not entirely correct, externalism is valu
able to the field of epistemology. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that by changing the
subject, the externalist is able to account for several of our intuitions regarding be
4BonJour, p. 37.
SBonJour, forthcoming.
6BonJour, forthcoming.
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lief. For this reason, we must consider what motivates the externalist to change the
subject. Is he simply being ignorant or is there a motivation for his "madness?"
When we consider a possible consequence of remaining within the tradition we find
that the externalist has a legitimate motivation for making the type of move he
does.
By remaining within the tradition, the internalist must contend with the skep
tic's criticism that internalism, when taken to its logical conclusion, results in our
inability to know anything. Skepticism about S's ability to possess knowledge results
as the internalist gets caught in an infinite regress about the justification of the Bp.
The skeptic's reasoning is as follows. In an effort to make S accountable for the be
liefs he holds, internalism requires that S provide reasons to think S's belief that p is
true. Additionally, in order to substantiate S's reasoning, the internalist requires S to
provide metajustificatory reasons for thinking his reasons that the belief that p is
true are themselves truth conducive. The skeptic argues that, to remain consistent,
the internalist must further require S to have a justification for his metajustification
and so on ad infinitum. In other words, S should be required to have reasons to
think that the reasons which justify the reasons to think the belief that p is true, are
justified. If the regress is not stopped, notes the skeptic, then S's is obviously never
justified in holding the belief that p and therefore never has knowledge. The only
way to stop the regress, continues the skeptic, would be to appeal to an unjustified
justifier.7 However, the internalist cannot appeal to an unjustified justifier without
appearing arbitrary, and thus it seems unlikely that S's belief that p can ever be
justified. If this is the case, how then, questions the skeptic, can S ever have knowl
edge about the most empirical of matters, such as S's having a body? Because the ex
ternalist is committed to the idea that we do in fact have some knowledge, external
ism does not require reasons, let alone metajustificatory reasons, for why S believes
p to be true. The skeptical argument against internalism can be viewed as providing
a strong motivation for externalism. However, to view externalism merely as a re
sponse to the skeptical problem would be to disregard, as we shall see, one of the
strongest arguments in favor of externalism. Furthermore, even if the skeptic could
be answered, internalism is still presented with the problem that anyone aside from
epistemologists does not have knowledge. It is therefor one of the thrusts of this pa
per to view externalism not merely as a response to the skeptical problem that in
7 Foundationalism does offer unjustified justifiers when appealing to basic beliefs. However, as
BonJour argues in chapter two of The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press, 1985) there are several problems with an appeal to foundationalism.
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ternalism faces, but rather as a theory with its own virtues. The following discussion
will demonstrate the intuitive strengths of externalism.
One demonstration of externalism's ability to account for our intuitions where
internalism does not, involves its ability to discriminate between instances of vary
ing epistemic value. Consider the following example:
Arnie, Betty, Carla, Dean, Ernie, and Fay are walking around in Epistemic
Gardens. When we come upon our flower lovers we find that all six hold the same
belief concerning why it is the jaqueminot rose has no thorns, and it so happens that
the belief is true. This, however, is where the similarities end. On the one hand,
Arnie, Betty, and Carla's belief is formed by a reliable belief forming mechanism
such that if the belief were not true, they would not hold it. Dean, Ernie, and Fay,
on the other hand, just happen to hold the belief. In other words, their belief is "ac
cidentally true." Listing the groups' epistemic possessions we have:

Arnie, Betty, Carla (Group A)
Dean, Ernie, Fay (Group B)
Truth
Truth
Belief
Belief
Reliable Belief Forming
No Reliable Belief
Forming Mechanism
Mechanism
According to an internalist stand, Group A and Group B have equal epistemic sta
tus. Yet, noting that the difference in the groups' epistemic possessions has to do
with the reliability of the groups' beliefs, the externalist questions whether or not we
would be selling Group A's belief short to equate their epistemic status with the
epistemic status of Group B's belief. After some consideration, our answer should be
yes, clearly, the epistemic status of Group A is higher than that of Group B. Think of
it this way: knowing what you do about why they hold their belief, wouldn't you
discount Fay's statement of her belief, yet have confidence in Betty's? The simple
fact of the matter is that Fay has no good reason to believe p or not p, while Betty's
belief has formed for what appears to be a good reason. Clearly we can conclude that
there is a difference in epistemic status of the two groups for the nature of Group
A's belief formation is substantial as compared to the nature of Group B's belief
formation. By arguing that those in Group A have justified belief and hence, knowl
edge, the externalist can account for the difference in the groups epistemic status.
The internalist cannot. In fact, the most the internalist can say about the difference
in epistemic status of the two groups is that members of Group A, though not of a
different epistemic status than those in Group B, make better "belief thermometers."
5

Another demonstration of externalism's ability to account for our intuitions
where internalism does not follows from the idea that the reliable belief forming
mechanism does create a difference in epistemic status. The externalist contends
that our intuition that there is a difference in epistemic status between the beliefs
held by Group A and B is unaffected by the fact that neither Betty nor Fay would be
able to explain their beliefs. This too appears in line with our intuitions. After all,
our measure of confidence has to do with the fact that Betty's belief was formed by a
mechanism that we trust, not with her ability to enunciate that mechanism. It is
natural that we have no confidence in Fay's belief because we realize that she could
have just as easily formed the exact opposite belief. Betty, on the other hand, because
of her reliable belief forming mechanism, could only hold the true belief. In sum
then, our intuitions are leading us to the following notion: group A is of a higher
epistemic status than group B, regardless of group A's ability to account for why this
is so. Once more, the externalist account of knowledge is in line with our intuitions.
A final intuition that arises out of the Epistemic Gardens case, which demon
strates externalism's ability to account for our intuitions where internalism does
not, underlies our preceding intuitions. It is simply that the objective viewpoint has
a function in the realm of epistemology. Both our intuitions that Group A is of
higher epistemic status than Group B, and our intuition that the awareness of this
status by Group A is irrelevant to that group possessing such a status rely upon our
intuition that an objective viewpoint has relevance when speaking of others' epis
temic status. Such an intuition, in line with externalist accounts of knowledge, is di
rectly at odds with the internalist who denies the value of any viewpoint aside from
S's when speaking of the justification of S's beliefs.
In all fairness to BonJour we must reconsider his argument, for he contends that
his view is in line with our intuitions. BonJour's criticism of the externalist posi
tion is in line with our intuitions to a degree. Given instances in which individuals
meet externalist conditions, BonJour questions whether or not these individuals are
being epistemically irresponsible to hold their beliefs. 8 As readers we reflect and
conclude that it certainly would be a form of irresponsibility to claim knowledge
merely on the basis of reliable belief formation, if one could not account for this
mechanism as a reason for why his belief should constitute knowledge. If our
friend from the Survey of Asian Art class were to claim that he/ she knew which
urn is from which century, wouldn't you question your friend's logic? After all,
8BonJour, p. 42.
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your friend can't tell you how he/ she knows this. What are his/her reasons? "I just
know I know," is all your friend can reply. The fact that you mayor may not know
about the association between his/her head injury and his/her belief is of no help
either (and chances are you wouldn't). And, even if you did know about the associ
ation, that doesn't help your friend's ability to make a credible statement of knowl
edge. The notion of "blind faith" or "gut feeling" that your friend is relying on is
worthless when what we're looking for is the "cold hard facts." In this regard, exter
nalism seems to be too weak, for it allows knowledge to be claimed too easily, al
most as if it weren't "earned." BonJour relates these notions of one's "earning" the
right to claim to know in terms of his notion of epistemic duty. BonJour contends
that just as we have a moral duty to try to do the right thing to the best of our own
reckoning, so too we have an epistemic duty to think the right thing. 9 Clearly, it
seems that our friend is shirking some kind of duty when he/ she starts making
knowledge claims.
Reviewing our externalist intuitions, we found that when S's belief p is formed
by a reliable belief forming mechanism, S's belief is of a higher epistemic status than
when the belief that p is accidentally true. This status remains the same regardless of
S's ability to account for the mechanism as the cause of the belief. Rather, we noted
that the mere fact that the mechanism caused the belief that p was all that mattered.
However, given our internalist intuitions we seem to feel that an individual is ac
countable for his or her ability to claim knowledge. The fact that S's belief was
caused by a reliable belief forming mechanism was of no consequence to the inter
nalist's determining whether or not S had knowledge, as S was neither aware of the
mechanism nor of its reliability.
I propose that we consider the matter in terms of a levels distinction which in
corporates the difference between non-epistemological claims and epistemological
claims. Second level claims are epistemological while all others are first level non
epistemological claims. By recognizing this distinction, we can account for our
seemingly contradictory intuitions in such a manner as to require that both exter
nalist and internalist criteria be met. Ultimately, by making just this sort of move
we will have a better understanding of the role of justification in epistemology. The
difference between non-epistemological and epistemological claims is a distinction
about the content of "p" regardless of whether we are speaking of believing p, or
justifiably believing p or even knowing p. Non-epistemological claims have as their
9BonJOUf, pp. 44-45.
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content representations of states of the world. However, they are not about S's men
tal states. Conversely, epistemological claims have as their content representations
of S's mental states, more accurately S's knowledge states. For example, a non-epis
temological claim would be "the sky is blue," while an epistemological claim would
be "S knows that the sky is blue."
Synthesizing externalist and internalist requirements is something new in epis
temology, to say the least. One approach currently being developed involves what
should properly be labeled the "bifurcation of knowledge."IO According to this the
ory, an individual S has knowledge in one of two ways. Both require that p be true
and that S hold the belief p. A final requirement is met when either S has adequate
justification for her belief, where justification is understood to mean "reasons" to be
lieve the belief is likely to be true, or S's belief has been formed by a reliable belief
forming mechanism. Such a mechanism can be understood as a type of Humean
"hard wiring"-an answer to why it is the way we think the way we do. These types
of beliefs are foundational beliefs. They exist only as a small number of basic empiri
cal beliefs. The theory which is internalist about justification, considers this second
manner of obtaining knowledge as knowledge possessed without and not requiring
justification. It is introduced to account for the belief that there are causes for the
formation of beliefs which are not reasons but nevertheless do result in knowledge.
Another approach involves a levels distinction that incorporates the use of in
ternalist and externalist constraints. It is offered by William Alston in his work
"Level Confusions in Epistemology. "11 What Alston proposes involves a distinction
between the first level justification of the belief p which he claims to be internalist,
and a second level metajustification of the belief that the belief p is justified which
he claims to be externalist. What Alston is claiming is that S is justified in her belief
that p if S can provide reasons for thinking that p is true. However, unlike the pure
internalist who requires a metajustification from S in terms of reasons for thinking
his reasons are justified, Alston allows metajustification to be external to S. The
distinction in Alston's theory is at the metajustificatory level-where the internalist
requires S to have a cognitive grasp of why her reasons are justified, Alston does
not. He is thus externalist in this regard.

101. W. Colter, in conversation.
11
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What I propose is that the correct distinction to be made between internalism
and externalism is unlike both of the above examples. It differs 12 from the first view
because that view allows for reliable belief forming mechanisms to account for only
a severely limited number of cases in which one can be said to possess knowledge,
and it is overall internalist; it differs from Alston's view in that the distinction
between levels is made on a different basis than Alston's, Le., the levels distin
guished are different, and the justification on the levels is reversed, Le. first level
justification is externalist while second level justification is internalist.
As mentioned earlier, central to my proposed levels distinction is the distinction
between non-epistemological claims and epistemological claims. The distinction is
noteworthy because of its great consequence to the discussion of justification in epis
temology. In order to begin a discussion of justification that recognizes this distinc
tion it is necessary to further elucidate the difference between what is meant by
"non-epistemological" and what is meant by "epistemological". The following ex
ample illustrates the difference:
Suppose that Norman, a clairvoyant, comes to believe as a result of his clairvoy
ance that the President is in New York13 (clairvoyance for purposes of this paper will
constitute a reliable belief forming mechanism). Suppose, additionally, that
Norman is unaware of his clairvoyance and in fact has no good reason, in his own
estimation, to believe that the President is in New York. Still, he holds this belief
just as firmly as you hold the belief that you are currently reading. What we shall
discern from this example is the difference between two possible situations that
might arise from Norman's predicament (one of which, we shall later see, is
justified by the state of affairs that currently obtains, the other of which is not.) The
following is true of both situations: it is true that the President is in New York,
Norman holds the belief that the President is in New York, and Norman's belief is
formed via a reliable belief forming mechanism. In the first situation Norman as
serts "that the President is in New York" while in the second situation Norman as
serts "that I know that the President is in New York." Norman's first assertion,
"That the President is in New York," is a claim about the belief regarding the
President's whereabouts and nothing more. It is therefore merely a non-epistemo
logical claim. By contrast, Norman's second assertion, "I know the President is in
12 It is not within the purpose of this essay to analyze other approaches to synthesizing externalist
and internalist requirements. Colter's and Alston's views are mentioned for the sole purpose of
distinguishing my theory from others. They serve only an explicative function.
13BonJour, p. 41.
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New York," is a claim about the President's whereabouts, and about Norman's be
lief that the President is in New York. Herein lies the difference: the second of
Norman's claims involves an epistemological claim. Not only does Norman hold
the belief that the President is in New York, he also holds the belief that he knows
that the President is in New York. The belief that he knows something is an episte
mological claim.
Having laid out the difference between non-epistemological and epistemological
claims and beliefs, we must now examine the value of this difference to the notion
of justification and the idea of a levels distinction. I will argue that a proper episte
mology distinguishes at the first level externalist justification as associated with
non-epistemological claims, while at the second level associating internalist
justification with epistemological claims.
Let us begin by examining justification on the first level. This level is distin
guished by the fact that the beliefs formed by S are non-epistemological. They are of
the sort that Group A held in the Epistemic Garden case and those held by
Norman 14 in Situation 1. They do not involve S's believing that S knows some
thing, merely that S believe something. What did we learn about this type of belief
from our first example that can be applied to our second that will help us determine
the sort of justification necessary at the first level? In the Epistemic Gardens case we
held that Group A's belief was of a higher epistemic status than Group B's. What
was it that motivated this conclusion? Given that the only difference between the
groups was the possession of a reliable belief forming mechanism, we apparently
identified the reliable belief forming mechanism as an indicator of higher epistemic
status. This is of great importance, as the reliable belief forming mechanism which
caused the belief is the exact sort of mechanism that the externalist identifies as a re
quirement for knowledge. If we define knowledge as justified true belief we find that
the reliable belief forming mechanism justifies the belief p at this level. We can con
clude then that if one's non-epistemological beliefs are reliably formed, that indi
vidual can be said to possess knowledge. An examination of our intuitions regard-

14Norman's two situations:
Situation 1
(non-epistemological claim)
1.p
1.p
2. belief p 2. belief p
3. reliable belief forming
mechanism for belief p

Situation 2
(epistemological claim)

3. reliable belief forming
mechanism for belief p
4. beliefKp
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ing non-epistemological claims has shown us that meeting the externalist require
ments of a reliable belief forming mechanism is sufficient to justify those claims.
In .addition to offering an intuitive account of externalist justification as
sufficient for non-epistemological claims, an examination of the inapplicability of
"epistemological duty" to non-epistemological claims will show that an individual
S need not be aware nor be in a position to become aware of the reasons that holding
the non-epistemological belief p brings her closer to the truth, and yet still she can be
said to possess knowledge of p. This is so because "epistemological duty" cannot be
assigned to the realm of non-epistemological belief. If we examine an analogy be
tween moral philosophy and epistemology we find that the notion of "duty" has no
place when talking of an individuals believing p. Consider the following:
Ethics
Epistemology
is analogous to
doing the right thing
having true beliefs
is analogous to
subjective justification
doing what is by one's
own lights is the right
thing
blindly but habitually
and discriminately
doing the right thing

is analogous to

blindly but habitually and
discriminately believing the
true thing

What concerns us about the above analogy15 is the final comparison between ethics
and epistemology. In ethics, while one who blindly but habitually and dis
criminately does the right thing would be described as amorat her actions would be
described as moral. Indeed the status of her actions as moral actions remains the
same even if she could not become aware of the moral value of her actions. The ac
tions have a moral character independent of the actor. Furthermore, it would seem
ridiculous to hold that she ought not perform these moral actions unless she be
comes aware of their moral value. However, it is important to realize that unless
the performance of her actions becomes or could become a conscious endeavor, she
could not claim herself to be a moral actor. By the same token, a person who blindly
but habitually believes the true thing ought to be recognized as knowing p, yet be
unable to claim herself to be a knower.

15K. Possin, class lecture.
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Let us now examine justification on the second level. Having examined
Norman's first situation we found that he does in fact have knowledge of the presi
dent's whereabouts. However, in the second situation we find that while he like
wise has knowledge of the president's whereabouts; he does not have knowledge
that he has such knowledge. His belief that he knows the president is in New York
is only accidentally true. In order for Norman to be justified in making his second
claim, both of the beliefs identified must meet the requirements of knowledge men
tioned earlier. However, because we are now dealing with epistemological claims,
the notion of non-accidentally true beliefs requires more than that the belief be
formed in a reliable manner. If we recall our discussion of BonJour's notion of epis
temic duty, we found that such a notion did appeal to our intuitions in a limited
sense. Although, as I have argued, one cannot be said to have an epistemic duty re
garding non-epistemological claims, it does seem that the notion of duty is applica
ble to epistemological claims. An individual is not prohibited, by some duty, from
continuing to believe nor from stating his non-epistemological beliefs; yet he cannot
extend this privilege to an epistemological belief regarding his non-epistemological
belief. Furthermore, if we recall our analogy to ethics, we can dig deeper into why it
is that internalist conditions need be met at the second level. While we concluded
that it would be ridiculous that our knower S not perform moral actions unless she
becomes aware of their moral value, we also noted that unless the performance of
her actions becomes or could become a conscious endeavor, she could not claim
herself a moral actor. Likewise, while we concluded that a person who blindly but
habitually believes the true thing ought to be recognized as possessing knowledge,
that same person ought not be able to claim herself a knower.
Thus far, I have sought to motivate our internalist and externalist intuitions and
through an analogy to ethics I have associated internalist intuitions with epistemo
logical claims and externalist intuitions with non-epistemological claims.
Additionally, I have proposed that these intuitions ought to be understood as in
dicative of a levels distinction in epistemology unlike any previously proposed. At
this point, my account of justification in epistemology is incomplete as I have yet to
answer why it is that one ought to associate externalist requirements with the first
level and internalist requirements with the second level.
Examining the second level first, we find that externalism is simply an improper
theory to be applied to epistemological claims. The reliable belief forming mecha
nism which constitutes justification for the externalist does not function when it
comes to our knowledge states. Consider what it is to have a belief formed in a reli
12

able fashion. Your belief that there are characters on the page before you, for in
stance, involves a causal relation between the empirical world and your thought
processes. It is the absence of this causal relation in the formation of epistemological
claims that prevents reliabilism from being an applicable justifier. Furthermore,
knowledge claims are the sorts of things we, as cognitive beings, must handle re
sponsibly. Making a knowledge claim without having reasons to think you can is ir
responsible. In claiming to know something one asserts a position in relation to the
empirical world that is privileged. We ought not claim that privilege without rea
sons. In sum, at the second level externalism is not a recourse, and internalism is
warranted. This being the case we can conclude that we ought to make internalist
requirements at the second level of epistemological claims.
Before moving on to the first level of justification, consider the following case
which will help illustrate the logic behind drawing the levels distinction in the
manner I am arguing. You recently had the good fortune of being invited to your
dear friend's home to share in her family's Christmas dinner. You accept the invita
tion and arrive at your friend's home early morning December 25. When you enter
her house you immediately smell a variety of mouth-watering odors. Taking a deep
breath, you exclaim to your friend that you can't wait to have a taste of that delicious
plum pudding her family is preparing. At this point we must ask ourselves "How is
it that your formed this belief given that your friend hasn't mentioned a word of
what the meal shall consist?" In answer, we explain your belief that the meal will
include plum pudding on the basis of your smelling what you perceive to be plum
pudding. We do not explain your statement on the basis of your going through the
following sort of cognitive process, upon smelling the belief you a) noted your olfac
tory senses were stimulated, b) you smelt the odor, c) you considered whether or not
smelling was a good indicator of the truth of odors, d) on the basis of a - c, formed
the belief that you smelt plum pudding and based your statement on that belief. The
only time these thought processes would occur would be if you claimed to know
that plum pudding was being prepared. This thought process then becomes what is
referenced when you are asked for reasons why it is you think you know p. In draw
ing the levels distinction in the manner I have argued for, we can account for our
basing beliefs on perception, and yet hold individuals accountable for asserting that
that they know their perceptions are true.
Shifting our attention to the first level of external justification we observe that
the requirements of externalism are less stringent than those of internalism. Non
epistemological beliefs are of a lower order than epistemological beliefs in that they
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do not require the same degree of responsibility from S as epistemological beliefs do.
S need only hold the belief that p with a degree of conviction (resulting from the fact
that the belief was reliably formed) to be in a position to make non-epistemological
claims. S ought not be held accountable for her non-epistemological beliefs and in
fact, we do not hold S accountable. Consider again, the mechanism for how it is we
come to have non-epistemological beliefs. When we perceive empirical objects we
form beliefs about them, not as a result of some cognitive process involving our
reasons for thinking what we perceive is actual; rather, a causal relation exists be
tween ourselves and the world which results in our forming the belief that p. Our
sense perception transduces data and beliefs are formed. The notion of accountabil
ity for non-epistemological beliefs is a contrived requirement of internalism which
is simply inappropriate. When we require more of S in forming his non-epistemo
logical beliefs, as the internalist does, other than that they be formed reliably, then S
just by satisfying externalist requirements does not have knowledge about the em
pirical world. Were we to insist on internalist requirements for justification only
epistemologists acquainted with internalist theory would have knowledge, as only
they would be in a position to offer metajustificatory reasons for their belief that p,
ordinary individuals would not. Surely, having knowledge is not the privilege of
these students of epistemology alone.
In sum, externalist justification is warranted on the first level of empirical claims
due to the very nature of how it is we form such claims. To apply internalist re
quirements at this level, would force us to the absurd conclusion that we do not
have knowledge of the empirical world.
Before concluding, it deserves mentioning that the levels distinction as I have
drawn it is subject to the same skeptical objection on the second level regarding S's
ability to know that S knows, that the internalist is subject to regarding S's ability to
know that p. What, then, is the virtue of a levels distinction which requires that ex
ternalist requirements be met for the justification of non-epistemological claims and
internalist requirements be met for the justification of epistemological claims? The
virtue of this distinction lie in the fact that ordinary individuals can be said to pos
sess knowledge. This conclusion is to be favored over the internalist theory which
concludes that ordinary individuals do not have knowledge, and over the skeptical
conclusion that no individuals have knowledge. Furthermore, to argue that S has
knowledge, though S may be unwarranted in claiming S has knowledge, is not "cold
comfort." It matters, for instance that Norman knows that the President is in New
York even if he can't claim he knows. How is this so? Norman's non-epistemologi
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cal claim, in light of my levels distinction, is justified, whereas by the internalist's
lights it is not. Similarly, your claim that there is a piece of paper before you (based
on your perception), in light of my levels distinction, is justified, whereas by the in
ternal lights it is not. In finding your's and Norman's non-epistemological claims
unjustified, the internalist puts them on a par with the non-epistemological claim
that there are twenty purple dancing elephants in front of you. Certainly, there is a
difference between your empirical claim that there is a piece of paper in front of you
and the empirical claim that there are twenty purple dancing elephants in front of
you. The virtue of my theory is that the difference between the two non-epistemo
logical claims mentioned above has been explained.
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